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Abstract
This Note argues that courts’ emphasis on the
ordinary observer test to prove illicit copying in film
is misguided. The ordinary observer test relies on
whether the accused work captures the total feel of
the copyrighted work, but overlooks an essential aspect of unlawful appropriation and copyright law –
the idea that only particular elements of a work are
copyrightable. If a jury is exposed to expert testimony regarding probative similarity before making
their evaluation, it is unlikely they will forget such
evidence when evaluating the illicit copying.
A better test for infringement would be one
that allows the ordinary observer, representative of
the intended audience, to detect whether there is a
similarity in the works, exclusive of an expert’s opinion. The focus should then shift to the more complicated issue of unlawful appropriation by permitting
the inclusion of analytic dissection and expert testimony.
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“[A]s a matter of triable fact, . . . there are only
twenty-nine basic plot ideas in the world.”1
INTRODUCTION
All writers think that their ideas are unique,
and no single writer is usually willing to admit that
the same idea can be independently thought of twice.
For this reason, copyright infringement suits are
quite popular in Hollywood. However, for this very
same reason, an overwhelming amount of such suits
fail.2
To prove copyright infringement, the Second
Circuit test requires that the claimant show, (1)
ownership of the copyright, (2) that the defendant
copied from claimant’s copyrighted work, and (3) that
the copying constitutes improper, or unlawful appropriation.3 Ownership is a “statutory formality,”
which is easily satisfied.4 However, proving that the
defendant copied a copyrighted work as a matter of
fact, which may consist of evidence of admission by
the defendant or circumstantial evidence of access to
the work, is more involved.5 Thus, factual copying

1 Nick Gladden, When California Dreamin’ Becomes a
Hollywood Nightmare; Copyright Infringement and the Motion
Screenplay: Toward an Improved Framework, 10 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 359, 360 (2003) (quoting RON SUPPA, THE BUSINESS OF
SCREENWRITING 66 (1999)).
2 Id.
3 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); 17
U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (2012).
4 See Gladden, supra note 1 (noting registration of a copyright
is a prerequisite to copyright infringement, but the
requirements for registration are minimal: the registered work
may simply be an independent creation of the copyright owner).
5 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468-69.
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involves proof of similarity, in addition to access.6
Access is established if there was a reasonable
opportunity to view the copyrighted work, as “[i]t is
obvious that one cannot copy a work unless he reads,
sees, or hears it,” thus establishing a reasonable inference of copying.7 However, access alone will not
suffice if no similarities between the two works exist.8 Once access and similarities have been established, an analysis is required to determine whether
such similarities necessarily prove copying.9 Here,
expert testimony is permitted to aid the trier of
facts.10 Furthermore, unless the similarities are
“striking,” an absence of access will usually preclude
a finding of copying.11
Nonetheless, the more complex issue tends to
fall within the third part of the Second Circuit’s test
for copying: that of unlawful appropriation. 12 The
unlawful appropriation standard for screenplays currently remains somewhat underdeveloped. 13 However, in considering what constitutes an illicit copying,
courts apply the test of the ordinary observer. 14 For
sufficient actionable appropriation, a film must
“leave the impression it was based on or used plaintiff’s work” from the point of view of the average per-

Id.
M.L. Cross, Literary and Artistic Rights for Purposes of, and
Their Infringement by or in Connection with, Motion Pictures,
Radio, and Television, 23 A.L.R.2d 244, § 28(a) (1952); Arnstein,
154 F.2d at 468.
8 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See Gladden, supra note 1.
14 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
6
7
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son.15
This Note argues that the courts appear to allow expert testimony where none is needed, but then
exclude such testimony where it is necessary. According to Judge Learned Hand, copying is illicit
where “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook
them.”16 If a jury is exposed to expert testimony regarding probative similarity, it is unlikely they will
forget such evidence when evaluating the illicit copying. The ordinary observer test relies on whether the
accused work captures the “total concept and feel” of
the copyrighted work.”17 The “total concept and feel”
overlooks an essential aspect of unlawful appropriation and copyright law – only particular elements of
a work are copyrightable.18
One reason for the lack of successful suits
against movie studios is the fact that many suits are
misguided, and the parties alleging infringement do
not necessarily understand how to dissect an unlawful appropriation.19 A better test for infringement
would be one that allows the ordinary observer, representative of the intended audience, to detect
whether there is a similarity in the works, exclusive
of an expert’s opinion. The focus should then shift to
the more complicated issue of unlawful appropriation
Cross, supra note 7, at § 2[b].
Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright
Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 727 (2010)
(quoting Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468).
17 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977).
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
19 K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringement and the
Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the
Standard for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 31 RUTGERS L.J.
173, 182 (1999); Lemley, supra note 16, at 719.
15
16
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by permitting the inclusion of analytic dissection and
expert testimony. Although a layperson may easily
detect an overall similar theme, the separation of
copyrightable material and elements should be detected by expert testimony, or perhaps is better analyzed as a matter of law.
Furthermore, the qualifications of the ordinary observer have been a source of dissent.20 Can
the average moviegoer truly differentiate between an
original and unoriginal work? Is the lay observer
equipped to differentiate between protectable and
unprotectable elements of a copyright? Does the lay
observer understand that copyright protection does
not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied?”21 Should the
courts allow expert testimony of dramaturges and
literary agents, or does that make the infringement
too trivial to be actionable?
Comparatively, trademark infringement cases
rely on consumer confusion and the judgment of the
reasonably prudent purchaser to determine actionable infringement.22 The reasonably prudent purchaser is akin to the ordinary observer in copyright
infringement cases. However, a reasonably prudent
Cross, supra note 7, at § 28(a).
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
22 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,
495 (2d Cir. 1961) (setting forth the 8-factor test for consumer
confusion, which includes: (1) Strength of the mark; (2)
Proximity of the goods; (3) Similarity of the marks; (4) Evidence
of actual confusion; (5) Marketing channels used; (6) Type of
goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; (7) Defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; (8)
Likelihood of expansion of the product lines).
20
21
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purchaser watching a film can easily identify the
product, and thereby any confusion as to the origin of
the product is more explicit than the confusion of an
ordinary observer identifying copyright infringement, where she must be told that there is an issue
of authorship or copyright ownership.
Alternatively, copyright infringement in film
requires the “ordinary observer” to be highly knowledgeable about the art of filmmaking. The complexities involved in making a film set it apart from the
art of music and literature, which also employs the
ordinary observer test. 23 Where the expression of
music is analyzed by patterns of notes, film employs
multiple mediums, which may cause confusion for
the ordinary observer in identifying the copyrightable elements.
The court employs the ordinary observer test
to determine copyright infringement in film through
the “eyes of men generally.” 24 Yet, this test is flawed
because the average observer of a movie is not accurately represented if they are influenced by expert
testimony initially. Furthermore, the ordinary observer is not necessarily one who can properly differentiate between what may and may not be copied.
The confusion of the observer watching a film should
relate to the question of whether similarities of copyrightable material exist. Courts should therefore allow extrinsic evidence of experts to support the testimony of the “average” quasi-expert that make up
23 The medium of computer software, which is also covered
under the Copyright Act, will not be addressed as I intend to
focus on mediums that employ artistic expression.
24 See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871)
(establishing that the “ordinary observer” test is the judgment
of a design, which is to be to be made by men generally “of
ordinary intelligence”).
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the juries of the Ninth and Second Circuits.
I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF INFRINGEMENT
IN MOTION PICTURES
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to enact copyright legislation in order to promote and protect the
works of authors.25 The Copyright Act, codified in 17
U.S.C., vests protection “in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” and
lists “motion pictures” as a category to be protected. 26
The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to
reproduce the copyrighted work, prepare derivative
works, distribute copies, and perform or display the
work publicly.27
By way of limitation, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) specifies that protection will not extend to any “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”28 Thus, in the seminal
case Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court found that
expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves, could
be copyrighted.29 This is where the ordinary observer test becomes somewhat complicated. In Baker,
plaintiff alleged copyright infringement of his book
that consisted of a unique double entry bookkeeping
system made up of a particular arrangement of columns. Defendant’s book used a similar system with
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
27 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
28 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
29 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (“The description
of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright,
lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The
object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use.
The former may be secured by copyright.”).
25
26
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a different arrangement of columns.30 The court
ruled that defendant was free to use the art of the
system described in the book, as long as the book itself was not copied.31 The court acknowledged that,
although the system of the art described in the book
may be protected, no exclusive claim existed in the
art of the system itself.32
The idea/expression dichotomy is particularly
important in the business of Hollywood filmmaking.
Even more so, the idea/expression dichotomy creates
complications for the ordinary observer in identifying
copyright infringement. Producers are at liberty to
find an idea and quickly make a motion picture on
the same subject or idea.33 Although copyright law
assumes that the author will be the owner of the
work, generally, in Hollywood, the author sells his
idea and assigns all his rights to a producer who creates the expression.34 Nonetheless, directors and
producers will be held contributorily or vicariously
liable.35
The complication of the idea/expression dichotomy is partly attributed to the complexity of a
making a Hollywood film. Hollywood films are arguably the single most expensive art of modern times. 36
The phases of creation include pre-production, production, post-production, and distribution, with hundreds of negotiations contracted for each phase, producing hundreds of additional transaction costs. Due
to these costs, only one in ten motion pictures will
Id. at 100.
Id. at 105.
32 Id.
33 Cross, supra note 7, at § 13.
34 Greene, supra note 19, at 178.
35 Id. at 179.
36 Id. at 180.
30
31
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ever yield a profit.37 Because of the risk and expense
involved in creating a movie, production companies
usually spend millions of dollars on “clearance experts” who will calculate the risk of potential legal
action surrounding any infringement risks.38
Yet, despite such efforts, copyright infringement suits continue to be brought in large numbers.39 This is because writers tend to believe in the
originality of their ideas, failing to understand that
an idea is not cause for a claim of copyright infringement.40 If the creator of the art is confused as
to what is copyrightable and what is not, won’t the
ordinary observer feel similarly if not more confused?
Litigation related to motion pictures can arise
based on theories of law ranging from contract, to
trademark, to right of publicity. Yet, the most popular of the claims tends to be based on copyright infringement.41 The allure of suing the makers of Hollywood films is apparent: lots of equity and the great
fear of bad publicity. Nevertheless, actions against
motion pictures rarely ever succeed.42 Possible reaId.
Id. at 180.
39 Id. at 180-81.
40 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
41 Greene, supra note 19, at 180-81.
42 Id. at 182; see Kerry Ryan, Using the Uniform Commercial
Code to Protect the “Ideas” That Make the Movies, 27 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 693, 694 (1987) (arguing that screenwriters face
a “high risk of appropriation” under copyright law); Columbia
Wins TV-Show Copyright Case, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 1999),
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/apr/10/business/fi-25924; Eriq
Gardner, Judge: Writer Must Pay Fox $40,000 for Claiming
“Alien vs. Predator” Stole His Script, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 24,
2011, 8:32 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/judge-writer-pay-fox-40000-227204; Eriq Gardner, You Sue
a Studio, They Make You Pay, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 2, 2011,
9:48 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/sue-studio37
38
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sons for this lack of success are threefold – either
movie studios rarely appropriate copyrighted works –
hence the reason behind clearance experts; the suits
are misguided because the claimant lacks the adequate copyright knowledge; or, the courts are hostile
to such claims, and thus employ more exacting
standards, making it extremely difficult to prove
copyright infringement.43
II. PROVING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Copyright infringement relating to motion pictures typically falls into three scenarios: (1) an author claims its literary work has been used as the basis of a film; (2) an author of a work of visual art alleges that his work was used in a film; or (3) an author of a visual work sues a film maker for digitally
manipulating the author’s image for use in a film. 44
The doctrine of scènes à faire puts forth the theory
that there are only a limited amount of basic plot
ideas in the world, and as a result, writers are bound
to create parallel, if not identical ideas. Due to this
fact, it is not surprising that the most popular area
for infringement suits is the allegation of plot appropriation.45
For a writer to prove copyright infringement
they must show: (1) copyright ownership, (2) copying
of the work, and (3) that such copying relates to coppay-95267; Frances Grandy Taylor, In Filmmaking, Lawsuits
Thicken Plot, HARTFORD COURANT (June 24, 1998),
http://articles.courant.com/1998-0624/news/9806240194_1_writers-truman-show-lion-king (stating
plagiarism and copyright cases brought by writers “are
extremely difficult to win”).
43 Greene, supra note 19, at 182.
44 Id. at 183.
45 Gladden, supra note 1, at 360.
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yrightable material and is therefore deemed improper appropriation.46 Under common law, an author of
a literary work (before publication) possesses the
same rights as in any other property he possesses.
Mainly, the author has full control over his work in
terms of first publication, and may prevent others
from using such work.47 The common law right to
one’s creative work is not exactly a copyright, since it
includes the right to refuse, to perform, publish,
dramatize, or copy.48 Once an author obtains a copyright under federal statute, their common law literary rights are abandoned.49 Accordingly, proving
copyright ownership in a copyright infringement action depends on proof of ownership in compliance
with the Copyright Act.50
A. The Two-Step Test
Copyright infringement consists of the following elements: (1) copying and (2) improper appropriation.51 Copying can be shown by either admission or
reasonable opportunity to access the material, and
similarity between the works. If there is evidence of
both access and similarity, an inference of copying is
established.52 Still, not all copying is illegal. Only
copying that includes more than a de minimis
amount of copyrightable expression will constitute
copyright infringement.53 This further refinement of
46 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977).
47 Cross, supra note 7, at § 3.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1162; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
51 Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1162.
52 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
53 Lemley, supra note 16, at 720.

540

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014)

The Copyright Infringement Test

identifiable copying is improper appropriation. 54
The two-step test may be proven in court
based on the majority approach, defined by the Second Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter and the Ninth Circuit in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions,
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.55 The Second Circuit answers the question of who evaluates the copyright
infringement in two parts. First is the analysis and
dissection stage, which receives the aid of expert testimony and asks whether the defendant copied from
a copyrighted work. Second is the “ordinary observer” test to determine if such copying was illicit, and
is apparent to the layperson.56 The Ninth Circuit refers to the same two steps, but as extrinsic and intrinsic analyses.57
1. Copying
Much time seems to be spent in courts analyzing both access and probative similarity, which make
up copying. Yet, the courts place the most emphasis
on the circumstantial evidence of access, which presumably allows the trier of facts to “reasonably infer
copying,” but also requires analytic dissection.58 The
dissection seems misplaced, as it is not the access
that the law protects, but rather the copyrightable
elements of an idea. The extrinsic evidence used to
establish access is focused on so much that it inevitably falls over to the probative similarity part of
copying, the second element of the first step, and to
the entire second step, finding a misappropriation.
Id.
Id. at 721-22.
56 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
57 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
58 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
54
55

541

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014)

The Copyright Infringement Test

In Arnstein, the court found, after listening to
the compositions of Ira Arnstein and defendant Cole
Porter, that similarities existed. Together with access, the court suggested, a reasonable jury may infer
copying.59 This test seems to correspond to that of
the ordinary observer test, which depends “on the response of the ordinary reasonable person.”60 The
court in Arnstein does not explain the relevance of
the analytic dissection element of the copying step,
only stating that it is.61
This inevitably influences courts to focus on
the dissection of copying and the access that Arnstein
allows to infer such copying, and focus less on deciding whether or not the copying was permissible. The
access hurdle can be overcome if and when it is
shown that a plaintiff’s work was available to the
public, or specifically available to the defendant. 62
Yet, the courts make it difficult to establish access
and may never get to the more crucial elements of
copyright infringement: that of misappropriation.
Courts require a reasonable possibility of access to the work, rather than a mere possibility. 63
Plaintiffs must prove a chain of events, which leads
to a reasonable possibility of defendant viewing the
work.64 Usually, there is an intermediary in between
the author and alleged infringer, yet courts demand
a showing of a close relationship in order to establish
a reasonable opportunity of access.65 What constitutes a close relationship for the courts has been exId. at 469.
Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1164.
61 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
62 Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 582 (4th Cir. 1996).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 583.
59
60
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tremely strict. Courts want to see an overlap of subject matter in the dealing between the intermediary
and infringer, and will not assume a close relationship without evidence of closeness related to the subject of the infringement.66 The requirement of finding evidence of a reasonable possibility of viewing the
work is more closely related to a reasonable opportunity to actually view the work.67 Already, the appearance of misappropriation seems diluted by extrinsic evidence, which may or may not prove substantial copying.
One example of the courts placing too much
emphasis on the evidence of a close relationship exists in Towler v. Sayles, in relation to the film Passion Fish.68 Virginia Towler had submitted her
screenplay, Crossed Wires, to SCS Films, a successor
company to Cinecom, who had previously released
two films of John Sayles, and also shared a chairman, an office, and employees. A representative of
the company had told Towler that her screenplay
would be forwarded to Sayles. Of course, they later
denied receiving the screenplay and the court found
as a matter of law that there was no way for a jury to
find that Sayles denied the truth.69 The court held
that the dealings between SCS and Sayles needed to
involve more of an overlap in subject matter to find
access.70 Yet, it seems quite likely, or at least reasonable, that a jury might find that someone from
Cinecom would have given the script to Sayles, considering Towler’s request for such and testimony that
such an agreement between Towler and a repreGladden, supra note 1, at 367.
Id.
68 Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 1996).
69 Id. at 582-83.
70 Id.
66
67
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sentative of SCS was made.71
Similarly, in Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment, the aforementioned Sayles and his film Lone
Star were the subject of an alleged infringement of a
script written by a high school teacher for her thesis,
entitled Concealed.72 Herzog had given her script to
William Cosford, a renowned film critic, and asked
him to serve on her thesis committee. Although he
declined due to time constraints, he had retained a
copy of Herzog’s thesis in his possession.73 Both
Cosford and Sayles had attended the Miami Film
Festival that same year. Evidence showed that the
two had a personal relationship where they had associated on many occasions and had been seen together at the festival in previous years.74 Although it
seemed quite probable that Cosford could have
passed along the script to Sayles, the court found
that it was unreasonable to presume that Cosford, as
a respected film critic, could have given Sayles the
script, acting as a “conduit for the film industry.” 75
It seems as though some courts get caught up
with the access factor and stray too far away from
the importance of copyright infringement: the actual
unlawful copying. Perhaps courts tend to eliminate
cases within the access stage because most cases that
get past this barrier still end in failure during further evaluation in the illicit copying phase, examining similarities. Yet, more often than not, courts will
“dispense the access requirement altogether if the
two works are so strikingly similar as to preclude inGladden, supra note 1, at 367-68.
Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th
Cir. 1999).
73 Id. at 1244.
74 Id. at 1245.
75 Id. at 1251.
71
72
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dependent creation.”76
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions
Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., copyright infringement of
the Krofft’s television series by McDonald’s television
commercials was the issue at hand.77 Here, access
was unnecessary to prove, since the similarities were
not only striking, the defendant also admitted to copying the idea from the plaintiff.78 Instead, courts
now focused on whether the copying constituted misappropriation. Krofft’s television series, Pufnstuf,
consisted of a fantasyland that was inhabited by fanciful costumed characters, talking books, and moving
trees. McDonald’s then released an advertising campaign for McDonaldland, which was based on the series and even employed the same set and costume
designers used for Pufnstuf.79 After the campaign
launched, the Kroffts lost their licensing agreement
with various toy manufacturers. In addition, the Ice
Capades replaced the use of the Pufnstuf characters
with the McDonaldland characters.80
2. Improper Appropriation
McDonald’s, the defendants in Sid & Marty,
contended, albeit unsuccessfully, that although the
ideas of McDonaldland and Pufnstuf were similar,
the expressions of the idea were too dissimilar to find
liability.81 Likewise, the difficulty in comparing
similarities between two works of literary art is that
elements such as plot and theme may seem similar
Id. at 1248.
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977).
78 Id. at 1165.
79 Id. at 1161.
80 Id. at 1162.
81 Id. at 1165.
76
77
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in the abstract, yet the law will only protect the expression of an idea and not the idea generally. 82 The
court in Sid & Marty relied on the ordinary observer
test and undoubtedly found that the “total concept
and feel” of McDonaldland’s characters were similar
to the characters of Pufnstuf and so infringement existed.83 Yet, the court overlooks the defendant’s argument about separating the idea from the expression. If an extrinsic test was allowed, and dissection
of the protected and unprotected elements was pursued, it is likely that the finding would not have resulted in liability.
To help clarify where the line is drawn between an idea and an expression of an idea, Judge
Learned Hand articulated the “abstractions test.”
The abstractions test states that with any work
many general patterns can be found, “as more and
more of the incident is left out.”84 Rather, it easy to
find similarities in two pieces of art when you ignore
the differences. This is why decisions of substantial
similarity cannot help much in new cases and must
inevitably be made ad hoc.85 Although there is no set
standard for copyright infringement cases dealing
with art, when courts dissect the elements of a literary work by character, plot, theme, and mood – a
move from the abstract to the specific – this helps establish a valid assessment of an improper appropriation.86
The plot of a screenplay is the crux of all copyright infringement claims. As mentioned previously,
82 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930).
83 Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1167.
84 Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
85 Id.
86 Id.; Gladden, supra note 1, at 365.
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writers easily find their ideas in films they watch,
but may not understand the difference between an
idea, which is unprotected, and the expression of the
idea, which may be protected. In the seminal case,
Nichols v. Universal Corporation, Judge Learned
Hand used his abstraction test to determine whether
appropriation was improper regarding defendant’s
film The Cohens and the Kellys and plaintiff’s play
Abie’s Irish Rose.87 Judge Hand searched through
each level of the stories, looking for the place to draw
the line between the expression and the idea. By focusing on the theme, plot, and character, the court
concluded that there was no misappropriation.
Both stories revolved around a Jew and an
Irish Catholic, living in New York, who marry
against their parents’ will. Yet, the theme of different backgrounds converging was both unoriginal
and, even assuming it was novel, uncopyrightable. 88
Likewise, the characters of each play are mere stock
characters, which the court describes as the “low
comedy Jew and Irishman.”89 Judge Hand explained
that “the less developed the characters, the less they
can be copyrighted.”90 By not allowing extrinsic evidence in determining misappropriation, the ordinary
observer may miss the similarities of stock characters, or they may automatically deem them to be exactly the same.
B. The Ordinary Observer in Film
The court in Arnstein leaves the issue of improper appropriation to the jury and categorizes it as
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120.
Id. at 122.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 121.
87
88
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an issue of fact.91 The concern is summed up as
“whether defendant took from plaintiff’s works so
much of what is pleasing to ears of lay listeners, who
comprise the audience for whom such popular music
is composed , that defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff.”92 Lay listeners are relevant because they make up the relevant audience in the Arnstein case.
For film, the relevant testimony would therefore rely on the general audience, which films are intended for. Perhaps it is easy to test the reaction of a
general audience to determine similar overall concepts between two films, as suggested by Arnstein.93
However, this does not seem to complete the test of
improper appropriation. The elements that deserve
protection are overlooked when improper appropriation is left in the hands of the lay observer who is not
properly educated on the differences between protectable and unprotectable elements.94
Audience members who make up the jury are
prone to evaluating the art as they see fit, or, more
likely, as was described by any expert testimony given during dissection of the copying elements. How
can they truly ignore the facts already established?
The question is more likely focused on what they see
as copied art, rather than deciding whether the art
copied falls under the law’s protection.
For example, scènes à faire are exceptions to
copyright protection because they are scenes that are
a necessary result of a certain situation. 95 Once an
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472-73 (2d Cir. 1946).
Id. at 473.
93 Id.
94 Lemley, supra note 16, at 739.
95 See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that “[e]lements such as drunks, prostitutes,
91
92
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author chooses a situation, “it calls for certain sequences in the methods of treatment, which cannot
be avoided, because they are, in the very nature of
the development of the theme, and are used by every
writer who knows his craft.”96 Although such scenes
flow from a common idea, they are likely to be expressed in a stereotyped form.97 Separating out such
scenes is helpful in determining whether there is improper appropriation and actionable copyright infringement.98 Yet courts do not elaborate on what
makes such stock scenes necessary and how the ordinary observer is to determine these scenes in copyright infringement evaluations.99
The phrase “every writer that knows his craft”
suggests that evidence of expert testimony is necessary to determine the true elements of similarities of
a work. While expert testimony is permitted in determining copying, the test of the ordinary observer
vermin and derelict cars would appear in any realistic work
about the work of policemen in the South Bronx” and thus were
unprotectable scènes à faire); CBS Broad., Inc. v. ABC, Inc., No.
02-CIV-8813-LAP 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
14, 2003) (establishing that stock devices in reality television
game shows, such as, a million dollar prize, dividing
contestants into teams, highlighting the surroundings where a
competition takes place, and depriving contestants of basic
human needs, all fall under scènes à faire, and are not
protected); Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013
(S.D. Cal. 1942) (establishing a scene where two characters take
refuge in a church after a storm is an uncopyrightable,
incidental scene).
96 Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 276
(S.D. Cal. 1945).
97 Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.
1986).
98 Id.
99 Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scènes à Faire Doctrine, 41
FLA. L. REV. 79, 88 (1989).
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for illicit copying does not. Nonetheless, jurors may
hear evidence, whether expert or lay, that may skew
their judgment of improper appropriation. While
they may be instructed to ignore the evidence, they
still are aware that such evidence exists and therefore may apply that, and its unprotectable nature, to
the work as a whole. Where a work is a combination
of protectable and unprotectable elements, a more
discerning ordinary observer test is necessary, which
requires that the court first filter out from consideration any non-protectable elements.100
Perhaps using the ordinary observer of the intended audience is inappropriate. If courts will not
allow extrinsic evidence to determine the more critical aspect of copyright infringement, then perhaps
the intended audience should be replaced with the
view of the writer.
III. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT COMPARED TO
TRADEMARK
More appropriately, trademark infringement
cases use the average consumer to fulfill the ordinary
observer test. Trademark infringement is defined as
a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the
source of the product.101 The ordinary consumer can
thus more easily identify trademark infringement
than the ordinary observer can identify copyright infringement. With copyright infringement, the average observer may not understand the origin of the
copyright, as it is not marked by a brand and is not
as easily identifiable as a trademark would be.
Therefore, copyright infringement should be held to a
100 Sheldon Abend Revocable Trust v. Spielberg, 748 F. Supp.
2d 200, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
101 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
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higher standard than that used for trademark infringement by focusing on illicit copying and allowing
extrinsic evidence for the same.
Where copyright seems to place more emphasis on the art and its expression, trademarks help aid
consumerism and thus, extrinsic evidence may not be
required because the ordinary observer is now the
ordinary purchaser. The general rule is that no more
of the trademark should be used than necessary for
the legitimate purpose.102 A fair use must be artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading.103 Since
a major relevant factor includes the consumer and
their impression, the reasonable prudent purchaser
is likely more competent than the ordinary observer,
allowing a lesser need for experts.
Under the Lanham Act, it is the likelihood of
confusion that is the standard for liability, rather
than actual confusion.104 To determine such likelihood courts have relied on “similarity of appearance,”
which is examined by “sight, sound, and meaning.” 105
Evidence of confusion is usually presented in the
form of consumer surveys. Thus, trademark cases
are “fact-driven” and “necessarily subjective and impressionistic.”106 Trademark infringement cases in102 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc.,
868 F.Supp.2d 172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
103 Id.
104 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
105 K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the
Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine – Trademark Abuse in
the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620 (2004) (quoting JANE C. GINSBURG ET
AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 398 (3d ed.
2001)).
106 Id. (quoting Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of
Confusion in Trademark Law, in 2 PLI’S SIXTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 85, 96).

551

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM Vol. 4.2 (2014)

The Copyright Infringement Test

volving motion pictures, therefore, have a more identifiable “ordinary observer” than the copyright infringement case, i.e., anyone who goes to the movies.
Another reason why the reasonable prudent
purchaser is more competent than the ordinary observer in a copyright infringement case against a
filmmaker is because, with trademark infringement
claims, the allegation does not involve an abstract
idea, but rather an unauthorized use of a concrete
mark.107 The line between copyright and trademark
claims is quite distinctive in that way. However, on
occasion, the line may become blurred. Such blurred
lines further demonstrate how the ordinary observer
is confused as to what constitutes copyrightable elements, and therefore requires extrinsic elements to
aid them.
For instance, in Comedy III Productions, Inc.
v. New Line Cinema, the defendant brought a trademark infringement claim for use of a clip of The
Three Stooges in New Line’s film, The Long Kiss
Goodnight.108 Even the court had trouble understanding how the use of a clip was the subject of a
trademark infringement claim and not a copyright
infringement claim.109 Yet, the plaintiff insisted that
the clip was an enforceable, cognizable trademark
because the clip itself was indicative of The Three
Stooges comedy.110 They claimed that their protected
right was in the “name, characters, the likeness, and
overall act.”111 Still the court found no cognizable
trademark, one that the public can recognize as a
15 U.S.C. § 1114.
GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 138-39 (3d ed. 2004).
109 Id. at 139.
110 Id.
111 Id.
107
108
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symbol of The Three Stooges, either by inherent distinctiveness or acquisition of a secondary meaning. 112
Another example of how the reasonable prudent purchaser is a more reliable test than that of
the ordinary observer exists in the 2012 decision of
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., in relation to film The Hangover Part
II. The plaintiff alleged trademark infringement for
display of counterfeit Louis Vuitton bags, used in an
airport scene by one of the main characters.113 The
character refers to the bags as a “Lewis Vuitton” and
that is the last reference made in the film. Louis
Vuitton complained that many consumers believed
that the counterfeit bags used in the film were genuine Louis Vuitton products.114
Using the Rogers test,115 the court noted that
finding artistic relevance “merely must be above zero.”116 “Above zero” is a standard that is not available to the ordinary observer. The courts defer the responsibility of determining “how meaningful” a connection between a trademark and artistic work must
be.117 The artistic relevance prong simply establishes the intent of a non-commercial association with
the trademark, eliminating any bad faith effort to

Id.
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc.,
868 F.Supp.2d 172, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
114 Id. at 175.
115 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (1989) (holding that the
copyright act should be construed to apply to artistic works only
whet the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression).
116 Louis Vuitton, 868 F.Supp.2d at 178 (quoting E.S.S. Entm’t
2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th
Cir. 2008)).
117 Id.
112
113
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exploit the mark.118 Again, the ordinary observer
does not have the luxury of dismissing bad faith for
artistic expression. The scene in which the counterfeit Louis Vuitton bag appears is used for comedic
effect and displays the character’s socially inept
traits. The court finds such use genuinely relevant
to the film’s story and thus, the first prong of the
Rogers test is satisfied.119
The second prong of the test relates to consumer confusion, which is the ultimate consideration
in trademark infringement allegations. If the use of
a mark is so misleading as to induce the public to believe the use was “prepared or otherwise authorized
by the plaintiff” the use will be denied First Amendment protection.120 This is an immediate recognition
upon the judgment of the reasonable prudent purchaser, an immediacy that is unavailable for the ordinary observer.
The Lanham Act is purposefully strict in its
accommodation of free expression. This is achieved
by limiting restriction of its application to those cases
that present the “greatest risk of consumer confusion: namely, when trademarks are used to ‘dupe[ ]
consumers into buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by the trademark owner.’”121
Therefore, if a trademark is not directly used to designate the source of the defendant’s work then the
interest in avoiding deception is slight. And if the
defendant is not using the mark as its own tradeId.
Id.
120 Id. at 179 (quoting Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l,
Ltd., 996 F.2 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993)).
121 Id. at 180 (quoting Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d at 1100,
quoting Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792,
806 (9th Cir. 2003)) (alterations in original).
118
119
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mark, then the viewer is not “confus[ed] . . . into believing that the two marks identify a single
source.”122
In the film, the counterfeit Louis Vuitton bags
appear for a few seconds in the background of a single scene, making it highly unlikely for a viewer to
even notice the difference in bags. Furthermore, it is
nearly implausible to presume that viewers would
take the character’s comments about designer bags
and attribute those views to the filmmakers themselves.123 Because there is no evidence of a “particularly compelling” likelihood that consumers will be
confused as to the source of the counterfeit bag as a
genuine Louis Vuitton, the First Amendment defense
and the public interest in protecting free expression
of noncommercial speech ultimately prevails.124
Simply put, if the reasonably prudent purchaser is confused as to Louis Vuitton’s connection
with the film, then there is an infringement. Yet, if
the ordinary observer is confused as to the source of
two works, this does not equate to infringement.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Although avoiding frivolous suits is imperative
in maintaining a streamlined court system, to retain
the essence of the copyright law, more emphasis
should be placed on determining misappropriation.
To do so, dissection of copyrightable elements should
be left out of the first part of the Arnstein test, where
similarities are analyzed, and placed in the second
factor where illicit copying is determined. 125
122 Id. (quoting 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:11.50 (4th ed.)).
123 Id. at 182.
124 Id.
125 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
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To show infringement, the main concern is
whether a defendant copied more than a de minimis
amount of protectable expression. The first inquiry,
therefore, is whether a defendant copied from the
plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit describes this inquiry of
substantial similarity as a simple one.126 Yet, dissection of the work into protectable and unprotectable
elements is employed. Similarities of two works are
probative of copying regardless of whether the similarities lie in protected elements or not.
Here is where defendants backed by expensive
lawyers overrun the small time writer: defendant
Hollywood producers and writers have the resources
to pick apart the elements which are questionably
copyrightable without having to give credit to the
original source. For this reason it appears more useful to employ the ordinary observer, instead of expert
testimony, to determine whether the “total concept
and feel” is similar to the copyrighted work and thus
probative of copying.
The second part of the test, which the Ninth
Circuit describes as more complex, is more appropriate for both analytical dissection and expert testimony.127 The line between the uncopyrightable idea
and the copyrightable expression of an idea is rather
thin and quite difficult for courts to decipher. 128
Nonetheless, the ordinary observer is unlikely to understand precisely which elements fall under copyright protection and will likely not be able to separate them from unprotected elements. Such concepts
are generally out of the purview of the public at
126 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
127 Id.
128 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930).
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large. Therefore, dissection of the work in question
is required to determine misappropriation, and often,
expert testimony is necessary to aid such determination.
Perhaps substituting extrinsic analysis for intrinsic analysis, and vice versa, for all copyright infringement cases may be problematic as most circuits
have already implemented the Arnstein-Krofft test of
the Second and Ninth Circuits. However, by allowing dissection and expert testimony in both prongs of
the test, courts can avoid the difficult problem of juries attempting to ignore evidence already heard.
Further, this would allow juries to understand what
elements should be analyzed as an ordinary observer.
Moreover, if the misappropriation prong is
better served by dissection of copyrightable elements,
it seems best if this was considered a factor to be decided as a matter of law. The very principle behind
illicit copying is an incident of copying that reaches
beyond the point of unlawful appropriation, or the
copying of the protected expression itself. Because
the line between idea and expression is already so
blurred, it seems appropriate for courts to be the determiner.
CONCLUSION
Most plaintiffs of infringement cases targeting
filmmakers and studios are not prepared to face the
realities and complexities of copyright law. After a
thorough evaluation of the elements above it is easy
to see why so many copyright infringement suits
tend to fail. It seems that courts are “intuitively hostile” to claims against films either because of the belief that too often these cases are based on a misunderstanding of what copyright in fact does protect or
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on an “obsessive conviction” prevalent in the minds
of many authors and artists alike, “that all similarities between their work and any other which appear
later must inevitably be ascribed to plagiarism.” 129
The proposal above will aid the courts in determining
more accurate decisions in copyright infringement
cases, thusly educating writers and juries alike in
what actionable copyright infringement actually entails.

129

Greene, supra note 19, at 185.
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